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The mark of bodily ownership
FREDERIQUE DE VIGNEMONT
When I touch the table, I have a sensation of pressure on my hand. My tactile
sensation includes sensations of resistance, texture and temperature, as well
as the sensation of the hand location where the pressure occurs. But does it
also include a distinctive experience of the hand as of my own? I am aware
that this hand is mine. But is the sense of ownership of my hand manifested to
me in a more primitive form than beliefs or judgements? Is there an experi-
ence of ownership independent of the judgement of ownership at the doxastic
level (for a similar distinction within the sense of agency, see Bayne and
Pacherie 2007)? Bermu´dez (2011) has recently argued in favour of a defla-
tionary account of the sense of ownership, according to which there is noth-
ing it feels like to experience one’s body as of one’s own. On his view, the
sense of ownership is exclusively judgemental; it has no counterpart at the
experiential level. To some extent, Martin (1992, 1995) defends a similar
view, according to which there is no distinctive positive phenomenology of
ownership as such, no felt ‘myness’ that goes over and above the mere ex-
perience of one’s bodily properties. In his view, bodily experiences are the be-
all and end-all of the sense of ownership.
On the deflationary conception of ownership the sense of ownership
consists, first, in certain facts about the phenomenology of bodily sen-
sations and, secondly, in certain fairly obvious judegments about the
body (which we can term judgements of ownership). (Bermu´dez, 2011:
161)
What marks out a felt limb as one’s own is not some special quality that
it has, but simply that one feels it in this way . . . a limb or a sensation
count as apparently belonging to one’s body simply by being felt.
(Martin 1992: 201–2)
Here I will present a series of counterarguments against the deflationary
conception of ownership. First, I will argue that there are belief-independent
illusions of ownership. Secondly, I will show that one can have bodily sen-
sations with no sense of ownership. I will then conclude that the notion of
‘experience of ownership’ is a good explanatory tool to account for these
borderline situations.1
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1 Experiences of ownership should not be conceived as purely ‘raw feels’ without represen-
tational properties. Rather, when experiencing bodily ownership, one represents one’s
body as of one’s own.
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1. Illusion of bodily ownership
Bermu´dez bases his argument in favour of the deflationary account on
Anscombe’s theory of knowledge without observation. Anscombe (1962)
claims that one does not know the position of one’s body on the basis of
bodily sensations because knowledge can be based only on sensations that
are independently describable. We have sensations of bodily posture, but they
are not separately describable. Hence, knowledge of bodily posture does not
derive from bodily sensations. Bermu´dez applies this analysis to the sense of
ownership. He argues that the experience of ownership cannot be independ-
ently describable. There can be nothing more than what is articulated in the
judgement of ownership. Hence, one knows that this body is one’s own, but
this knowledge is not based on the experience of the body as of one’s own.
However, Bermu´dez’s argument fails to show that one does not experience
one’s body as of one’s own. Anscombe herself did not deny the existence of
sensations that accompany position (e.g. ‘pressure here, a tension there, a
tingle in the other place’ Anscombe 1962: 72). What she denies is that these
sensations play an epistemic role for knowledge of bodily posture. Hence, at
most what Bermu´dez shows is that one is not aware that this is one’s hand in
virtue of having experiences of ownership. One is aware that this is one’s
hand simply in virtue of having bodily sensations. No more is required. But
that does not show that one has no experience of ownership. This only shows
that if one has such experience, then it plays no epistemic role.
Still it is not even clear that one should grant Bermu´dez that the experience
of ownership cannot be separately describable from judgements of owner-
ship. On one interpretation of Anscombe’s rather opaque notion of ‘separ-
ately describable sensations’, a sensation of x is separately describable if one
can have a sensation that presents one as being x whilst correctly believing
that one is not x (Harcourt 2008). For experiences ownership to be separ-
ately describable, there must be cases in which one reports feeling as if a body
part belonged to one while correctly judging that this is not one’s own body
part. Interestingly, this seems to be typically the case in the Rubber Hand
Illusion, which has become the experimental design to investigate the sense of
ownership (Botvinick and Cohen 1998). In the classic set-up of the illusion,
participants sit with their left arm resting on a table, hidden behind a screen.
They are asked to fixate at a left rubber hand presented in front of them, and
the experimenter synchronously strokes with two paintbrushes both the par-
ticipant’s hand and the fake hand. After a couple of minutes, the majority of
participants report that they feel tactile sensations on the rubber hand, in-
stead of their biological hand that is stroked. When asked in a questionnaire,
they report feeling as if the rubber hand belonged to them. At the behavioural
level, they mislocalize their hand in the direction of the rubber hand. In
addition, when they see the rubber hand being hit by a hammer, while
their biological hand is not threatened, they display an affective physiological
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response similar to the one induced by threats towards their own hand
(Ehrsson et al. 2007).
This illusion uses a well-known principle in psychological literature,
namely, visual capture of touch. In a nutshell, when in conflict, visual infor-
mation wins over somatosensory information in most situations. Of special
interest for us here is the fact that participants can feel as if the rubber hand
were their own handwhile they are clearly aware that this is a rubber hand that
is stroked in front of them. It then seems that the content of their experience
can be at odds with the content of their ownership judgement (e.g. ‘It feels like
my hand, but I do not believe it’s my hand’). As noted by Peacocke (ch. 2):
A hand’s being experienced as yours is part of the phenomenology of
ordinary human experience. As elsewhere, this phenomenology should
not be identified with any kind of judgment ‘that’s mine’. That judgment
is not made (in fact, it is rejected) when a subject knows that he is
experiencing the rubber hand illusion, but he still experiences the
rubber hand as his.
There are two possible objections against the argument from ownership
illusion. First, Bermu´dez (2011) argues that one cannot experience fake
hands as one’s own because one can spatially ascribe sensations only within
the limits of one’s body. Therefore, he claims, one cannot ascribe the experi-
ence of ownership to fake hands. This response, however, is puzzling. If by the
limits of one’s body, he means the biological boundaries, then this leads him to
deny that one can feel sensations in phantom hands for instance. If he means
the apparent limits of one’s body, as they are represented in the brain, then it
should be possible for fake hands to be embodied in the representation of one’s
body. Then nothing would prevent one to localize sensations in the embodied
fake hand. This is actually what happens in the Rubber Hand Illusion. In
addition to the ownership illusion, the illusion also consists in mislocalizing
tactile sensations on the rubber hand. And if one can feel tactile sensations in
fake hands, then why not the experience of ownership?
A possibly more promising way to reject the argument from illusion is to
deny that the Rubber Hand Illusion is a belief-independent illusion of own-
ership. It is indeed unclear what participants exactly report, their experience
or their judgement of ownership. Typically, they are asked to rate the extent
of their agreement or disagreement with statements such as ‘it seemed like the
rubber hand belonged to me’, ‘it seemed like the rubber hand was my hand’
or ‘it seemed like the rubber hand was part of my body’. For instance, on a
scale that goes from 3 (strongly disagree) to þ3 (strongly agree), 131 par-
ticipants rated ownership at þ0.4 after synchronous stroking and at 1.2
after asynchronous stroking (Longo et al. 2008). These results are difficult to
interpret. One may argue that the weakness of the ownership rating in the
synchronous condition merely shows the lack of ownership at the
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experiential level. On this view, participants report their degree of confidence
in their judgements about the rubber hand rather than their experience. But
what reasons does one have for not taking the participants at their words
when they claim that they experience the rubber hand as their own? The
statements describe appearances (‘it seemed like’). In addition, the ownership
illusion is associated with behaviours that indicate that the report that the
rubber hand seemed like one’s hand is not a mere way of speaking. They
mislocalize their hand towards the rubber hand without being aware of it
(they do not report feeling it closer to the rubber hand) and they affectively
react vividly when the rubber hand is threatened. These behaviours can be
taken as evidence that the illusion does not occur only at a cognitive level, but
also at a lower sensory and affective level. One may then argue that the
weakness of the ownership rating reflects the elusiveness of the phenomen-
ology of ownership in general.2 There is little doubt that if there are experi-
ences of ownership, they are not vivid, or at least not to the same extent as
painful experiences, for example. Otherwise, there would be no dispute
whether experiences of ownership exist or not. But the fact that they are
not readily available to introspection does not imply that they do not exist.
Actually, although one receives a constant flow of information about one’s
body, one is most of the time barely aware of one’s body. While typing on a
laptop, one does not vividly experience one’s fingers on the keyboard. The
conscious field is primarily occupied by the content of what one is typing,
and more generally by the external world rather than by the bodily medium
that allows one to perceive it and to move through it. At most, the body
remains at the margin of consciousness (Gurwitsch 1985; James 1890).
Likewise, one may claim that the phenomenology of ownership, like most
of bodily awareness, is recessive and marginal. For all that, there is no reason
for denying that one does not experience one’s body as one’s own.
2. The lack of ownership
Let us now consider Martin’s argument in favour of a deflationary account of
ownership. In his view, if the phenomenology of ownership is not exhausted
by the phenomenology of bodily sensations, then there should be cases in
which one experiences bodily sensations while experiencing the converse of
ownership, namely, disownership:
If the sense of ownership is a positive quality over and above the felt
quality of the sensation and the location – that there is hurt in an ankle
2 The referee offered an interesting alternative interpretation for the low ownership rating.
Participants may have only a quasi-experience of ownership that is similar to some extent,
and to some extent only, to the way one normally experiences one’s body. This under-
standing of the Rubber Hand Illusion actually goes in line with the view I defend. Indeed,
if there is something like a quasi-experience of ownership, then there must be something
like a ‘normal’ experience of ownership.
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for example – then it should be conceivable that some sensations lack
this extra quality while continuing to possess the other features. Just as
we conceive of cold as the converse quality of warmth, could we not also
conceive of a converse quality of sensation location such that one might
feel pain in an ankle not positively felt to belong to one’s own body (. . .)
we can make no sense of either possibility. (Martin 1995: 270)
According to Martin, the sense of ownership is ‘possessed by all located
sensations’ (1995: 277). Hence, there is no ‘extra quality’ of ownership. One
may, however, worry about the scope of Martin’s claim. Is it true that one
has a sense of ownership for every single bodily sensation that is felt as of
being located? There are some cases in which it may be dubious, like internal
organs.3 Another problematic series of cases can be found in projected sen-
sations in extraneous objects. One can localize sensations beyond the actual
limits of one’s body like in phantom limbs, rubber hands and tools. Yet,
those sensations do not systematically possess a sense of ownership. It is
true that participants feel the rubber hand on which they localize tactile
sensations as their own. But while having dinner, one does not experience
the cutlery as part of one’s body in the same way as one’s hands. And this is
so despite the fact that one feels the resistance of the steak in the knife. Nor
does one behave in a way that indicates awareness of the cutlery as of one’s
own. Typically, one uses a spoon to stir the pot of boiling soup instead of
one’s fingers. If a body part ‘counts as apparently belonging to one’s body
simply by being felt’ and if projected sensations are on a par with sensations
localized in one’s actual body, then any object in which one localizes sensa-
tions should ‘count as apparently belonging to one’s body’. But this is not the
case.
A proponent of the deflationary conception may object to the claim that
one can feel sensations in external objects like tools, or at least that these
sensations are of the same type as the sensations that one experiences in one’s
limbs. One may, for example, claim that a blind individual experiences
pressure first in her hand and then projects the sensation on the tip of her
cane when touching the floor. Because she is aware of the contact between
the cane and the floor only indirectly, one should not expect her to experience
the cane and the hand in the same way. However, the fact is that sensations
at the tip of the tool are often more salient than sensations of holding the tool
in the hand. At the experiential level, one is not aware of ‘projecting’ sensa-
tions to tools. Rather, it seems immediate. There is also some empirical evi-
dence that indicates that tools are processed as parts of one’s body. For
3 For example, William James (1890: 242) notes: ‘certain parts of the body seem more
intimately ours than the rest’. Interestingly, in Kilivila (Australasian language of the
Trobriand Islanders), body parts like arms or legs are always associated with a possessive
pronominal suffix indicating a degree of intimate possession, whereas internal organs are
associated with a term indicating a more distant possession (Senft 1998).
the mark of bodily ownership | 647
example, after tool use participants mislocalize the centre of their arms as if
their arms were longer (Sposito et al. 2012). Finally, it was found that sensa-
tions in body parts and in tools follow the same spatial principles. When your
hands are crossed and your eyes closed, you have difficulties in judging which
hand was touched first. Likewise, when your hands are not crossed, but you
hold two sticks that are crossed, you experience the same difficulties in
judging which stick was vibrated first (Yamamoto et al. 2005). This indicates
that the vibration was experienced as of being located at the tip of the sticks
(which were crossed) rather than on the hands that hold them (which were
uncrossed). Hence, feeling sensations in tools is not a mere way of speaking. It
is worth noting that Martin (1992, 1995) himself defends the view that we
have sensations in tools that are of the same type as sensations localized within
the actual limits of one’s body. Still one has no sense of ownership for tools. It
seems that it does not suffice for the sense of ownership that one feels sensa-
tion located in a body part or an object.
This is confirmed by the possibility of the precise phenomenon that
according to Martin ‘one can make no sense of’, namely the possibility of
feeling sensations in a body part that does not feel like one’s own. Losing
one’s body, so to speak, can sometimes take as little as falling asleep on one’s
arm. When one wakes up, the arm feels numb and almost as an alien dead
object attached to one’s body. But then disownership results from sensory
loss and as soon as one regains sensations in the arm, the alienation ceases.
What is more puzzling is that some patients can deny ownership of their limb
while still feeling sensations in it. They suffer from what is known as soma-
toparaphrenia (sometimes called asomatognosia, cf. Feinberg 2002) resulting
from a lesion of or an epileptic seizure in the right parietal lobe. It is often
associated with motor and somatosensory deficits, spatial neglect, anosogno-
sia and anarchic hand. However, somatoparaphrenia cannot be reduced to
any of these disorders (Vallar and Ronchi 2009). What characterizes soma-
toparaphrenia is the denial of ownership of a part of the body.
E: Close your eyes and tell me what you feel when I’m touching your
hand.
P: That’s not my hand!! . . . It’s not mine . . . Someone left it there. I don’t
know who he was . . . I don’t know who attached it to my body.
E: Isn’t it a little bit weird to have a foreign hand with you?
P: No! My hand is not like this! (Invernizzi et al. 2012: 148)
Interestingly, it has been reported that a patient cried out of pain when the
examiner pinched his ‘alien’ hand (Melzack 1990). Another patient asked his
doctor: ‘Once home could I ask my wife, from time to time, to remove this
left arm and put it in the cupboard for a few hours in order to have some
relief from pain?’ (Maravita 2008: 102). A study conducted on two patients
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also found that they were able to report with perfect accuracy when they
were touched on their ‘alien’ hand (Moro et al. 2004). Yet, they maintained
that the hand on which they felt touch were not their own, but someone
else’s.
Hence, patients with somatoparaphrenia report feeling sensations in the
hand that they disowned. One cannot a priori rule out these cases for the only
reason that they are not normal because if one were to do so, then Martin’s
claim could never be falsified. The fact is that any case of bodily sensations
associated with disownership is doomed to be pathological, at least in the ac-
tual world.4 Still one way to disqualify these cases is to claim that the denial
of ownership occurs exclusively at the doxastic level. Somatoparaphrenic
patients are indeed delusional. One may then be tempted to explain their
delusion in terms of reasoning deficits. If so, the fact that some patients deny
ownership of their hand cannot constitute counterevidence for the deflation-
ary conception. However, according to the current most influential theory of
delusion, the two-factor model (Davies et al. 2001), the delusional belief
results from a sensory or motor impairment leading to abnormal experiences
that the patient tries to account for. Abnormal reasoning biases participate
only in the feeling of confidence associated with the delusion. One may then
suggest that in the case of somatoparaphrenia, the abnormal experience is an
experience of disownership, which in turn leads to a judgment of disowner-
ship. Actually Bermu´dez himself (2011) grants the fact that the patients with
somatoparaphrenia experience disownership. What warrants this interpret-
ation is the contrast with depersonalization disorder. Those patients feel that
their body is no longer their own, but they do not believe it. Although they
know this is not true, they still find their experience distressing. Hence, a
denial of ownership can occur at the phenomenological level without occur-
ring at the doxastic level.
Nonetheless, Bermu´dez (2011) disqualifies this type of disorder because,
he claims, experiencing disownership does not necessarily result from the ab-
sence of ownership experiences. In his view, the experience of disownership is
grounded on some abnormal features of bodily experiences felt in their ‘alien’
hand, which somehow indicate alienation and which are unrelated to the
absence or presence of putative ownership experience. Against this interpret-
ation, it is worth noting that the patients report no difference in their tactile
experiences between their ‘alien’ hand and their other hand, which they feel
as their own (for more details, see de Vignemont 2007). Furthermore, their
pain behaviour is normal (e.g. wincing, aversive reaction, spontaneous verbal
complaint). It thus seems that they feel normal bodily experiences, at least at
the phenomenological and behavioural levels. Contrary to what Martin
4 We will not consider here possible worlds in which one can be connected to other people’s
bodies.
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(1995) assumes, one can actually feel pain in an ankle not positively felt to
belong to one’s own body.
To conclude, I have reviewed a range of borderline phenomena that can be
taken as evidence against the deflationary conception of ownership. Each
case may be open to other interpretations, but taken all together, I believe
that they constitute a strong support for my view. The notion of ownership
experience can account for a range of various phenomena in a parsimonious
way. It is a useful simple explanatory tool, which allows for a single unified
explanation of ownership illusions, for phenomenological differences be-
tween sensations in one’s limbs and in tools, and for disownership patholo-
gies. There is something it is like to experience parts of one’s body as one’s
own, some kind of non-conceptual intuitive awareness of ownership.5
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Liar!
JONATHAN WEBBER
Successful lying and misleading are both forms of intentional deception by
means of language. The liar deceives by false assertion, the misleader by false
conversational implicature. I argue that society has good reason to respond
with greater opprobrium to the liar than to the misleader, that each member
of society has good reason to disdain lying more than mere misleading, and
that each of us would be wise to avoid the greater dishonour of being
branded a liar. My argument rests on the point that lying damages both
credibility in assertion and credibility in implicature, whereas misleading
damages only credibility in implicature.
I further argue that deceptive communication without regard to truth
value, which Frankfurt memorably identified as the essence of bullshit,
should be understood in the same framework. Bullshit conversational
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